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Despite receiving widespread attention in the adult literature, virtually no information 
about the effects of thought suppression currently exists using a developmental psychopathology 
perspective in adolescents.  The current study describes the development and preliminary 
validation of The Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire, a self-report measure of thought 
suppression strategy use among adolescents.  A principal factor analysis revealed an identical 
factor structure to the adult Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994) and included 
subscales measuring Distraction, Reappraisal, Social, Worry, and Punishment strategies.  
Adequate evidence of internal and test-retest reliability was obtained.  The TCQ-A evidenced 
strong validity when tested for relations to measures of internalizing symptoms among adults.  




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Intrusive thoughts are unwanted, persistent, and often distressing psychological 
occurrences that take the form of verbal thoughts, mental images, and/or recurrent memories. 
While such thoughts are most closely associated with emotional disorders such as obsessive-
compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, most 
individuals, even those without psychopathology, experience these intrusive thoughts (Rachman 
& de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984).  Early investigations into the methods for 
controlling intrusive thoughts have focused exclusively on adults engaging in thought 
suppression, an active attempt to avoid thinking of the unwanted thought.  Wegner, Schneider, 
Carter and White (1987) were the first to examine thought suppression experimentally by 
randomly placing participants into one of two conditions that either instructed them to “not think 
of a white bear” (suppression) or to “think of a white bear” (expression) for a fixed period of 
time.  Half of the sample performed suppression first, followed by the expression task. The 
remaining half performed the expression task before suppression.  The results showed a 
significant increase in the number of target thoughts during the expression task if it was preceded 
by a period of suppression as compared to the number reported by participants who did not first 
engage in suppression.  Wegner and colleagues theorized that this “rebound effect,” or increased 
frequency of target thoughts after ending engaging in thought suppression, could be due to the 
underlying strategies of thought control, namely distraction by replacing the target thought with 
another innocuous thought.  The authors posited that the more a participant replaced the target 
thought with a distractor thought, the more the distractor and target became associated, thus 
further triggering target thoughts.  
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From Wegner’s seminal study, numerous other investigations have sought to further 
understand the effects of thought suppression in both non-clinical and clinical populations.  
Through greater understanding of these effects, thought suppression has been incorporated into 
several cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models of psychopathology.  To aid clinicians and 
researchers in quickly assessing thought suppression, self-report measures have been developed 
in addition to experimental paradigms.  With a single exception, thought suppression 
experiments and assessments have only been developed for use with adult samples.  Using the 
knowledge gained from the adult literature, the current proposal aims to develop a self-report 
assessment of thought suppression for adolescents.   
1.1 Experimental Effects Of Thought Suppression  
While Wegner et al. (1987) was the first to investigate the effects of thought control, 
many researchers questioned the methodology.  Principally, the expression task drew criticism 
for introducing thought reporting practice effects.  Likewise, it was believed that the expression 
task may have produced a ceiling effect for the control condition, potentially washing out any 
immediate increase in the frequency of the target thought during the suppression period 
compared to the initial expression control period (i.e., “immediate enhancement effect”). 
Subsequent investigations of thought suppression have, therefore, removed the expression task 
and have added a control task in which the group received instructions to report any thoughts 
including the target thought.  In this way, the mere mention of the target thought in the 
suppression condition instructions may be controlled.  Despite altering the original paradigm to 
address methodological concerns, Clark, Ball, and Pape (1991) found no evidence of the 
immediate enhancement effect.  Nevertheless, the authors noted that the suppression group 
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demonstrated a significantly greater number of target thoughts during the free-reporting phase as 
compared to control groups, thus replicating the rebound effect. 
Similarly, Clark, Winton, and Thynn (1993) aimed to compare instructional methods by 
modifying Clark et al.’s (1991) original paradigm to include three conditions: unrestricted 
suppression, mention-control, and suppression without distraction.  The suppression without 
distraction group was instructed to perform thought suppression without engaging in distraction 
techniques, thus testing Wegner et al.’s (1987) hypothesis that use of distraction may cause the 
rebound effect due to forming associations with distractor thoughts.  Consistent with the Clark et 
al. (1991) results, but inconsistent with Wegner et al.’s (1987) distraction hypothesis, the 
rebound effect was seen in both suppression conditions.  No evidence of an immediate 
enhancement effect was shown in the results suggesting that the rebound effect is a consequence 
of engagement in thought suppression.  
 While, several studies have supported the existence of a rebound effect and have failed to 
find evidence of an initial enhancement effect, still others have found the opposite.  Two studies 
using mention-control groups, one of which also used a suppression-without-distraction group, 
found a significant increase in target thought occurrences during suppression periods as 
compared to controls who did not suppress.  While an immediate enhancement effect was noted, 
no rebound effects were found (Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Merchelbach, Muris, van den Hout, 
& de Jong, 1991).  Several methodological differences exist between experimental paradigms of 
thought suppression, namely the method of thought reporting (verbal reporting vs. numerical 
frequency tallies), which may have accounted for inconsistent findings of both the rebound and 
initial enhancement effects.  
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 One of the major criticisms of early experimental thought suppression designs has been 
the use of emotionally neutral target thoughts.  Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) argued that 
previous methodologies lacked ecological validity and therefore the suppression process 
measured may qualitatively differ from self-initiated suppression outside of the laboratory.  The 
overwhelming majority of unwanted thoughts experienced in non-clinical samples are negatively 
valenced (Rachman & de Silva, 1978), unlike the neutral and often uncommon target thoughts 
used in the aforementioned studies.  As such, Salkovskis and Campbell designed an experiment 
using negatively valenced and personally relevant target thoughts.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of five conditions: unrestricted suppression, mention-control, suppression using 
distraction, suppression without using distraction, and suppression with a distracting cognitive 
task.  After completing one condition, all participants then engaged in an unrestricted thought 
reporting period.  Globally, the results revealed evidence in support of the immediate 
enhancement effect.  However, the study failed to support the previously found rebound effect.   
Interestingly, a comparison of the distraction conditions revealed that thought suppression that 
purposely used distraction demonstrated the immediate enhancement effect; however, neither a 
specific distraction task nor engaging in suppression without using distraction demonstrated the 
initial enhancement effect, which is in direct contrast to demonstrations of the initial 
enhancement effect during instructions not to engage in distraction (Lavy & van den Hout, 
1990). 
 To further address the problem of ecological validity, Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) 
designed an experiment in which participants recorded the frequency of a personally relevant and 
negatively valenced intrusive thought over the course of four days.  Unlike previous designs, 
which took place over the course of minutes in a laboratory, Trinder and Salkovskis extended the 
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experimental window to approximate daily instances of thought suppression.  Participants were 
assigned to one of three groups: suppression, mention-control, and a condition in which 
participants were instructed to think about the thought for as long as possible whenever the 
thought naturally occurred.  Overall, the thought suppression group demonstrated greater 
frequency of thought intrusion as compared to the mention-control and think-through groups, 
which is indicative of the immediate enhancement effect.  Due to the methodological limitations 
of the study, the rebound effect could not be examined.  As the authors note, the finding that the 
think-through group did not significantly differ from the control group but was significantly 
different than the suppression group suggests that the enhancement effect is a direct result of 
active suppression rather than time spent consciously monitoring for the thought.  While 
Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) and Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) have demonstrated the 
immediate enhancement effect using negatively valenced, personally relevant target thoughts, 
there have been similar studies that have failed to find any significant effects of thought 
suppression (Muris, Merchelbeck, van den Hout, and de Jong, 1992; Roemer and Borkovec, 
1994). 
 Among non-clinical adult samples, emotionally neutral target thoughts have produced 
mixed findings with some studies supporting the immediate enhancement effect but not the 
rebound effect and others finding the opposite.  Studies using emotionally valenced and 
personally relevant target thoughts have likewise produced inconsistent results.  A meta-analysis 
of published experimental investigations revealed a significant rebound effect; however, there 
was little evidence to support the initial enhancement effect (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001) 
regardless of the emotional valence of the target thought.  Clearly, there is a lack of consensus 
across the experimental studies of thought suppression; nevertheless, the literature is suggestive 
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that thought suppression may have bimodal effects on the frequency of intrusive thoughts among 
adults.  
 While there are numerous studies examining thought suppression effects in adults, a 
dearth of such investigations exist using youth populations.  To date, only one peer-reviewed 
study has experimentally examined thought suppression in a sample of children.  Gaskell, Wells, 
and Calam (2001) used a non-clinical sample of children aged 7 to 11.5 years to investigate 
thought suppression effects using emotionally neutral and negatively valenced target thoughts.  
Care was taken to develop and pilot test instructions and procedures that were developmentally 
appropriate.  Children were randomized into one of four groups: suppress-neutral target, 
monitor-neutral target, suppress-anxious target, or monitor-anxious target.  In the two neutral 
target conditions, children listened to a neutral story.  Children in the two anxious target groups 
discussed a personally relevant worrisome or scary thought with the experimenter.  Children in 
the suppression groups were then asked to not think of the target story and children in the 
monitor groups were asked to think about anything including the target story.  Subsequently, all 
children engaged in an unrestricted thought reporting period.  The results indicated that, 
regardless of valence, children engaging in thought suppression reported significantly fewer 
target thoughts than children who were not suppressing.  Thus, the initial enhancement effect 
was not found.  Similarly, children did not demonstrate the rebound effect, in that no significant 
increase in target thoughts occurred during the unrestricted thought reporting phase.  The authors 
note that despite the lack of tangible thought suppression effects as seen in the adult literature, 
manipulation checks indicated that children were able to understand and engage in the 
instructions of the experiment.  In itself, this significant manipulation check is a key finding in 
that it indicates, even young children are able to engage in thought suppression as well as 
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thought monitoring, though the accuracy and comprehensiveness of these processes have yet to 
be determined.  As Gaskell et al. (2001) note, it is possible that the ability to engage in thought 
suppression effectively, to where clear enhancement or rebound effects are demonstrated, may 
develop over time.  To date, no investigation has examined children’s development of the ability 
to engage in thought suppression. 
1.2 Relation of Thought Suppression To Psychopathology 
 Over the past three decades, cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models of 
psychopathology have grown in prominence and have greatly influenced current 
conceptualizations of the development, maintenance, and treatment of many psychological 
disorders.  One of the first, and arguably the most influential, of these models was Beck’s (1976; 
Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, & Riskind, 1987) model in which he hypothesized that recurrent 
and distorted cognitions form the basis of emotional disorders and that these distorted cognitions 
vary in thematic content depending upon the disorder.  For example, Beck and colleagues 
proposed that depression was rooted in cognitions of perceived hopelessness and loss in the past, 
whereas anxiety has its basis in distorted cognitions about possible future losses or threats (Beck 
et al., 1987).   
 Given the emphasis placed on intrusive thoughts in cognitive models of psychopathology, 
the paradoxical effects of thought suppression, may be an additional factor in the development 
and maintenance of psychopathology.  Wegner and Erber (1992) proposed that thought 
suppression is a dual process in which the person must search for distractor thoughts as well as 
actively monitor current cognitions for the presence of the target thought.  Wegner and Erber 
believed that the active monitoring process increases the availability of the target thought, thus 
increasing the thought’s expression.  Likewise, Wegner et al. (1987) suggest that the distractor 
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target search coupled with the active monitoring process may produce associations and 
elaborations upon the to-be-suppressed target thought, further increasing the occurrence of the 
thought.  This theorized net increase in unwanted cognitions when engaging in thought 
suppression has been incorporated into cognitive and cognitive-behavioral models of 
psychopathology including obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, and major depressive disorder. 
1.2.1 Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
 Perhaps the most logical application of the effects of thought suppression is within 
models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  According to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, OCD is typified by the experience of repetitive and intrusive 
thoughts, images, or impulses that are often nonsensical or are seen as personally inappropriate 
(DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Also included the definition of OCD 
symptomatology is that persons experiencing obsessions must attempt to “…ignore or suppress 
such thoughts, impulses, or images or to neutralize them with some other thought or action” (p. 
462, American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Therefore, engagement in thought control is a 
diagnostic requirement for OCD involving obsessions.  Rachman (1998) proposed a cognitive 
model of obsessions that implicated both the noxiousness of the intrusive thought as well as the 
effects of thought suppression as triggers for increasing the experience of the intrusive thought.  
In Rachman’s model, individuals who experience unwanted thoughts as being of greater 
significance or as more aversive will subsequently be motivated to engage in though suppression 
at a greater frequency or intensity.  However, as Rachman notes, this increased engagement in 
suppression ultimately leads to an increase in the frequency of the obsession due to the rebound 
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effects noted by Wegner and colleagues (1987; 1992) as well as a failure to habituate to the 
intrusive thought (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).   
Salkovskis (1996) proposed a similar model in which the interpretation of the intrusive 
thought is such that the individual assumes increased personal responsibility for the thought and 
its perceived consequences.  A heightened sense of personal responsibility is theorized to lead 
the sufferer to engage in neutralizing actions, which can include overuse of thought suppression.  
According to the model, reliance upon cognitive control leads to decreased inhibitory control of 
thoughts and actions due to the allocation of mental resources, thus leading to an increase in 
intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviors (Salkovskis, 1996). 
 The proposed pathways and effects of thought suppression in Rachman and Salkovskis’ 
models of OCD have been supported by experimental findings using negatively valenced and 
personally relevant target thoughts in clinical samples.  Janick and Calamari (1999) compared 
participants with OCD to a non-anxious control sample.  Overall, results did not find evidence 
supporting the initial enhancement or rebound effects in the OCD sample as compared to the 
non-clinical group.  However, the authors note that a lack of power to detect any such differences 
limited the ability to draw conclusions.  Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, and Foa (2002) 
conducted an experiment comparing participants with OCD to non-anxious and socially anxious 
control groups.  Unlike Janick and Calamari (1999), Tolin and colleagues used a white bear as 
the target thought due a concern that the use of personally relevant target thoughts may have 
been analogous to having participants with OCD suppress their obsessions, a behavior in which 
they likely already engage.  The results revealed that participants with OCD demonstrated a 
significant increase in target thoughts during suppression as compared to a baseline thought 
reporting phase, thus demonstrating the initial enhancement effect.  Neither control group 
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demonstrated the enhancement effect.  The authors conclude that a deficit in successful thought 
suppression may differentiate OCD from other anxiety disorders.  Within the cognitive-
behavioral models of OCD, greater thought suppression ability may adequately control unwanted 
thoughts, limiting their frequency, duration, and/or intensity.  However, if suppression ability is 
low, the individual may experience intrusive thoughts in greater frequency and may perceive 
those thoughts as more aversive due to the difficulty in effectively controlling them, thus 
beginning Rachman’s (1998) cognitive model.  Findings that those with OCD show significantly 
higher distress ratings of their unwanted thoughts as well as greater subjective uncontrollability 
of unwanted thoughts compared to controls (Calamari & Janeck, 1998) lends further evidence 
supporting the inclusion of thought control ability into cognitive-behavioral models of OCD. 
1.2.2 Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
 Another clear target for the application of thought suppression is within models of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD).  One of the core features of GAD is the recurrent 
experience of intrusive worries that specifically take on an uncontrollable quality (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Wells (1995) proposed a cognitive model of GAD in which he 
delineates two types of worries: those regarding life events and those he termed “meta-worries” 
or worries about thoughts.  In his model, worries become clinically significant when the focus 
turns inward becoming, essentially, worry about worries.  He proposed several avenues for why 
such a transformation may occur.  In particular, worry increases thought monitoring making 
individuals more aware of intrusive thoughts and that meta-worries prompt individuals to further 
engage in thought suppression causing the rebound effect.  It has been suggested that worry itself 
can be used as a thought control strategy in that attention on one worry may be diverted to a less 
anxiety provoking worry (Wells, 1995; Wells & Davies, 1994).  Overly strong beliefs about the 
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utility of worry are built up, serving to maintain the disorder.  Likewise, frequent avoidance of 
worry and related stimuli prevent habituation to the anxiety that worries provoke (Wells, 1995). 
 In an effort to determine the influence of individual ability to control intrusive cognitions 
in GAD, Becker, Rink, Roth, and Margraf (1998) compared participants with GAD to those with 
social phobia and non-anxious controls on two thought suppression tasks: the first involved 
suppressing an emotionally neutral thought of a white bear, while the second task involved 
suppressing thoughts about a personally relevant intrusive worry.  Participants with GAD 
demonstrated significantly more thought intrusions when suppressing worries than when 
suppressing emotionally neutral thoughts, thus showing an immediate enhancement effect for 
negatively valenced stimuli.  Both control groups showed the opposite pattern, suggesting that 
deficits in thought suppression of worry-specific cognitions typify GAD but not social phobia.  
The authors also point out that cognitive control deficits do not appear to be universal as seen in 
the relatively successful suppression of white bear thoughts.  Unlike OCD, thought suppression 
ability (or lack thereof) in GAD does not seem to be universal to all unwanted thoughts, just to 
those thoughts that typify the disorder (i.e. intrusive worry).  This finding seems to support the 
model proposed by Wells (1995), in that those with GAD may hold heightened beliefs about the 
utility of worry and therefore may be less inclined to suppress such intrusions. 
1.2.3 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
 Ehlers and Steil (1995) and Ehlers and Clark (2000) proposed a cognitive model of 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that implicates thought suppression as a maintaining factor 
in the disorder.  PTSD is characterized by persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event via 
intrusive thoughts, memories, or perceptions as well as avoidance of associated stimuli, which 
can include avoidance of thoughts (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Ehlers and 
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colleagues (2000; 1995) propose a three factor model of PTSD that includes deficits in memory 
processing for the event, overly negative valuations of the event and associated stimuli, and 
engagement in cognitive and behavioral control strategies that prevent processing of the event 
and serve to maintain the disorder. One cognitive thought control strategy Elers and colleagues 
propose is thought suppression.   
 Ehlers, Mayou, and Bryant (2003) tested a cognitive model of PTSD that includes 
thought suppression in a sample of children and adolescents who experienced a traffic accident.  
The overall prediction model accounted for approximately 50% of the variance, which was 
significantly greater than the prediction provided by children’s subjective ratings of trauma 
severity.  Within the model, each factor, including engagement in thought suppression, 
significantly predicted PTSD symptom severity.  While their findings seem to support the role of 
thought suppression as a maintaining factor of PTSD in children, Ehlers et al. (2003) only used a 
single question to assess thought suppression.  As such, additional research is needed to replicate 
their findings and determine the extent to which children with PTSD engage in thought 
suppression as well as the specific cognitive strategies they may use.   
1.2.4 Depressive Disorders 
Cognitive models of depression focus primarily on negative cognitions about past 
experiences and the subsequent attributions depressed individuals make about the self and the 
world based on those negative cognitions (Beck, 1976).  Some of these cognitive distortions 
seem similar to the experience of intrusive thoughts or worries inherent in several anxiety 
disorders.  For example, commonly experienced depressive cognitions are catastrophizing 
(thinking the worst possible outcome is the most likely to occur), selective abstraction (attending 
more strongly to negative events and discounting positive ones), and misattributing blame 
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(assuming greater personal responsibility for negative events than is warranted; Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979).   Wenzloff, Wegner, and Roper (1988) suggest that deficits in thought 
suppression ability for negative cognitions may play a causal or maintaining role in depression.  
The authors tested their hypothesis in a series of thought suppression experiments using 
depressed and non-depressed college students.  Participants read either a positive or a negative 
story and were asked to imagine themselves as the main character in each.  They were then 
randomly assigned to a suppression or a control group in which they reported their frequency of 
intrusive target thoughts.  Participants then performed the same task using the opposite valenced 
story.  Overall, Wenzloff et al. (1988) found that depressed participants demonstrated the 
rebound effect when using negative target thoughts; non-depressed participants did not show 
such a trend.  A second experiment indicated that the use of positively valenced distractor 
thoughts was more successful than using negatively valenced ones to suppress unwanted 
thoughts.  However, the depressed participants showed significantly greater use of negative 
distraction than the control group.  The authors speculated that negative cognitions might be 
more readily accessible to depressed individuals, causing depressed individuals to rely on 
negative distraction despite being a less effective strategy than using positive distraction.  It 
seems, then, that depression may involve the use of inappropriate thought suppression 
techniques, leading to incomplete or unsuccessful suppression. 
1.3 White Bear Suppression Inventory 
 While experimental studies have demonstrated the effects of thought suppression in both 
clinical and non-clinical samples, little information about the natural frequency of engaging in 
thought suppression can be gained from these investigations.  As a result Wegner and Zanakos 
(1994) developed the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) to assess self-reported 
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frequency of thought suppression.  An exploratory factor analysis revealed a single factor 
accounting for 55% of the variance (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994).  Internal consistency was good 
for several non-clinical undergraduate samples (αs = .87-.89) and test-retest reliability varied by 
the length of time between administrations but was nevertheless adequate (rs = .69-.92).  
Likewise, the WBSI demonstrated adequate convergence with measures of depression, anxiety, 
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms (rs = .38-.58).  Wegner and Zanakos (1994) also found that 
the WBSI significantly predicted the presence of obsessions but not compulsions in a sample of 
students with elevated scores on the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory (Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980).  Lastly, the study revealed that a model including the WBSI and a measure of 
depression sensitivity significantly predicted levels of depression.  The initial study of the WBSI 
indicated adequate reliability and validity.  
A subsequent investigation confirmed the original one-factor structure, which accounted 
for less variance than the original study (41%).  The replication also found good internal 
consistency (α = .89) and test-retest reliability (r = .80; Muris, Merkelbeck, & Horselenberg, 
1996).  Likewise, the WBSI correlated positively with measures of depression, worry, anxiety, 
and obsessive-compulsive symptomatology (r = .35-.57).  Muris et al. (1996) also examined the 
WBSI in relation to the frequency of intrusive thoughts during an experimental investigation of 
thought suppression.  The results demonstrated a significant relationship between frequency of 
intrusions during the experiment and self-reported frequency of thought suppression on the 
WBSI. 
Despite these initial findings, an exploratory factor analysis by Blumberg (2000) used an 
alternate rotation procedure and revealed that a three-factor model best explained the variance of 
the WBSI.  Blumberg suggested that these three factors consist of frequency of intrusive 
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thoughts, engagement in thought suppression, and use of distraction to avoid thoughts.  Due to 
those new findings, Blumberg questioned the specificity of the WBSI in that it may not represent 
actual thought suppression but rather thought intrusion frequency regardless of the use of thought 
suppression or distraction.  Likewise, McKay and Greisberg (2002) determined that, unlike 
previous findings, the WBSI did not correlate with a measure of obsessions and compulsions.  
They suggested this finding may be attributed to the interpretation that the WBSI primarily 
assesses success in thought suppression rather than thought suppression attempts generally.   
It can also be argued that the WBSI has narrow utility in understanding the effects of 
thought suppression in clinical populations due to the limited amount and specificity of 
information the measure provides.  That is, the WBSI gives information on the frequency of 
engagement in thought suppression and, as McKay and Greisberg point out, limited information 
about the frequency of intrusive thoughts.  However, little information can be gleaned about the 
specific techniques people use to suppress unwanted thoughts.  This is especially relevant in 
clinical populations where specific thought suppression techniques are thought to be adaptive 
and others maladaptive. 
1.4 Thought Control Questionnaire 
 Understanding the specific methods with which individuals attempt to reduce unwanted 
thoughts may improve the effectiveness of therapeutic techniques by targeting and remediating 
ineffective cognitive control.  To this end, Wells and Davies (1994) developed the Thought 
Control Questionnaire (TCQ) to better understand the specific methods used to control or 
suppress unwanted thoughts in adults aged 18 years and older.  Fifty-nine items were developed 
from semi-structured interviews with clinical and nonclinical participants about the strategies 
they used to control unwanted thoughts. The clinical sample consisted mainly of patients 
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receiving treatment for OCD and GAD.  A factor analysis revealed a six-factor structure and 
identified 26 items that did not significantly load onto any factors.  The remaining 36 items were 
tested in a separate sample revealing a five-factor model accounting for 42% of the variance.  An 
additional six items were removed to make the number of items in each factor consistent.  The 
final version of the TCQ consisted of 30-items and five factors: distraction (e.g. “I keep myself 
busy”), social (e.g. “I talk to a friend about the thought”), worry (e.g. “I worry about more minor 
things instead”), punishment (e.g. “I get angry at myself for having the thought”), and reappraisal 
(e.g. “I try a different way of thinking about it”).  Responses are recorded on a four-point Likert-
type scale between 1 (never) and 4 (almost always).  The TCQ is scored by summing the items 
within each subscale and then summing each subscale to get a total score.  Some items require 
reverse scoring. 
 In their initial investigation using a non-clinical sample of undergraduate and graduate 
students, Wells and Davies found acceptable internal consistency for each subscale (αs = .64-
.79).  Interscale correlations were low, which suggests each subscale measures a unique thought 
control strategy.  Finally, test-retest reliabilities for each scale were in the good to excellent 
range (rs = .67-.83).  Wells and Davies also tested the TCQ’s relation to other measures of 
psychopathology including obsessive-compulsive behaviors, anxiety cognitions, and worry.  
From these correlations, the authors suggested that the distraction subscale represented a widely 
used thought control method but was not indicative of psychopathology specifically because no 
correlations between distraction and measures of negative cognitions were found.  Similarly, the 
authors hypothesize that the social and reappraisal subscales may be associated with healthy 
coping because these subscales did not correlate with measures of psychopathology.  Lastly, the 
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worry and punishment subscales were positively correlated with measures of disordered 
cognition, which suggests that these subscales represent maladaptive thought control strategies.   
 These initial findings suggest the TCQ is a valid and useful self-report measure; however, 
the psychometric properties were tested in non-clinical samples only and may not generalize to 
clinical populations.  Reynolds and Wells (1999) examined the psychometric properties of the 
TCQ in a clinical sample of adult participants diagnosed with either major depression or PTSD.  
A principal components factor analysis revealed a six-factor model accounting for 55% of the 
variance.  Reynolds and Wells suggested that the additional factor divided the original distraction 
factor into behavioral and cognitive types of distraction.  However, the authors highlighted that 
the sixth factor consisted of only two items and that this is typically considered insufficient to 
comprise a factor (Kline, 1994).  The internal consistency alphas for each subscale were between 
.65 and .78 and most subscales did not correlate with each other with a few notable exceptions.  
Reappraisal significantly and positively correlated with worry, distraction, and punishment.  
Likewise, worry and punishment were significantly correlated.  The possibility exists that these 
intercorrelations simply indicated that those with psychopathology engaged in a variety of 
thought control strategies regularly, while non-clinical participants relied on a single or select 
few strategies.  Convergent validity analyses showed negative correlations between distraction 
and measures of depression and PTSD, suggesting that distraction may serve as a positive coping 
skill.  Similarly, within depressed participants, punishment was positively associated with 
anxiety and depressive symptoms.  Social control was negatively associated with avoidance in 
participants with depression as well as those with PTSD, suggesting social control strategies are 
adaptive.  Lastly, the reappraisal subscale was negatively correlated with depressive symptoms in 
the depressed group but not for those with PTSD.  Reynolds and Wells (1999) posited that this 
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could indicate a deficit in the ability to use reappraisal in the development or maintenance of 
depression. 
 Overall, studies of the psychometric properties of the TCQ indicated that the measure has 
adequate reliability and validity, though discriminant validity was not assessed in either study.  
The studies also seemed to indicate that social, reappraisal, and distraction strategies are 
associated with positive coping or adaptability and that worry and punishment strategies may be 
indicative of maladaptive coping and psychopathology in adults.  This conceptualization of 
adaptive and maladaptive thought suppression has been assessed in several studies examining 
TCQ profiles within specific disorders.  Punishment, worry, reappraisal, and social thought 
control strategies were seen significantly more often in participants with OCD than non-anxious 
controls (Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997).  However, when compared to anxious controls, only 
worry and punishment were significantly related to OCD symptomatology (Abramowitz, 
Whiteside, Kalsy, & Tolin, 2003; Tolin, Worhunsky, Brady, & Maltby, 2007).  Additionally, 
treatment effects were found demonstrating a significant decrease in the use of punishment 
control and a significant increase in the use of distraction upon receiving an exposure and 
response prevention treatment for OCD (Abramowitz et al., 2003).  These findings suggest that 
maladaptive thought control techniques (e.g. punishment and worry) are associated with OCD 
symptomatology and that cognitive-behavioral treatments effectively reduce engagement in such 
strategies.  
Similar results have been found in GAD as well as depression; punishment and worry 
strategies were used more frequently in a GAD sample than by non-anxious controls who 
showed significantly greater use of distraction and social strategies (Coles & Heimberg, 2005). 
This suggests that distraction and social strategies are adaptive while punishment and worry are 
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maladaptive.  Wells and Carter (2009) further demonstrated that participants with GAD, as well 
as those with depression, engaged in greater use of worry and punishment control strategies, a 
finding that was replicated in a second depressed sample (Watkins & Moulds, 2009).  Those with 
GAD have been shown to use reappraisal significantly less often when compared to non-anxious 
controls and use punishment strategies more often than depressed participants (Wells & Carter, 
2009).  However, Wells and Carter (2009) found no difference in the use of worry strategies 
between those with depression and those with GAD.  This finding seems to support the often 
noted similarities between generalized anxiety worries and depressive ruminations and may 
suggest similar maintaining mechanisms in both disorders.  Wells and Carter (2009) also 
demonstrated that depressed participants used social strategies less frequently than non-
depressed/anxious participants, which may be indicative of social withdrawal symptomatology 
specific to depression. 
Cognitive models of psychopathology implicate thought suppression as playing slightly 
varying roles, but thought suppression is considered important to the conceptualization of several 
disorders nonetheless.  However, studies of specific thought suppression techniques within 
disordered samples suggest that adaptive and maladaptive strategies exist and are largely the 
same regardless of the diagnosis.  Principally, worry and punishment strategies appear to be 
maladaptive while distraction, social, and reappraisal appear to be adaptive or at the very least, 
unspecific to psychopathology in adults.  No such information is currently known about the 
implications or processes of thought suppression in adolescent psychopathology. 
1.5 Rationale for Current Study  
While there exists a large body of research exploring thought suppression effects and 
strategy use among adults, a dearth of such research exists among adolescent populations.  
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Several accepted cognitive models of psychopathology include engagement in thought 
suppression as a factor in the development or maintenance of anxiety and mood disorders.  
Although there is evidence to support the inclusion of thought suppression in these models based 
on the adult literature, there is a lack of information on thought suppression using a 
developmental psychopathology perspective in adolescents.  Additionally, no self-report 
measures have been published to assess adolescents’ engagement in thought suppression or the 
various strategies used to control unwanted cognitions.  Therefore, the purpose of this 
investigation is to develop and test the psychometric properties of an adolescent version of the 
Wells and Davies (1994) Thought Control Questionnaire.  This new version, the Adolescent 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ-A), could provide researchers and clinicians with valuable 
information regarding the cognitive processes of commonly experienced psychopathology in 
adolescents.  Information gleaned from such a measure will hopefully be useful for future 
investigations in determining the accuracy of adult cognitive models of psychopathology in 
adolescent populations.  Confirming or disconfirming such models also carries implications for 
designing efficacious cognitive and cognitive-behavioral treatments for youth. 
1.6 Developmental Considerations 
Several self-report measures of automatic cognitions for adolescent psychopathology 
have been developed (e.g. Ronan, Kendall, & Rowe, 1994; Schniering & Rapee, 2002; Stark, 
Humphrey, Laurent, Livingston, & Christopher, 1993).  An examination of the reliability and 
validity of several of these measures suggests that children as young as six years old are able to 
report experiences of automatic thoughts.  Awareness of one’s own cognitive experiences (i.e., 
metacognition) is the first necessary step in being able to report upon strategies used in 
controlling those cognitions. However, the use of thought control techniques is arguably a more 
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complex process than mere awareness of intrusive thoughts.  Therefore, additional 
developmental factors must be considered in determining an appropriate lower age limit for the 
proposed measure.   
1.6.1 Self-Reporting of Metacognition 
 Educational psychologists have explored children’s’ effective use of metacognition 
relating to learning by focusing exclusively on self-regulated learning strategies.  Studies of 
children’s self-knowledge of learning strategies can serve as an analog for metacognitive 
processes involving cognitive control and suppression.  Sperling, Howard, Miller, and Murphy 
(2002) developed a self-report measure of children’s educational metacognition (e.g. children’s 
knowledge about their learning strategies).  Using a sample of students in grades 3-9, the authors 
found evidence of adequate reliability and validity suggesting that children in this age group 
were able to report on educational knowledge as well as strategy usage during the learning 
process.  Although educational metacognition is conceptually distinct from the use and reporting 
of thought control strategies, it appears that children as young as third-grade are able to report 
upon some metacognitive processes.  
1.6.2 Executive Functioning 
 Executive functions are complex and essential abilities for performing purposeful and 
directed acts.  Broadly, executive functions consist of skills such as maintaining and shifting 
attention, working memory, self-monitoring, goal setting, and planning (Anderson, Anderson, 
Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001).  All of these skills seem crucial to successfully using 
cognitive control strategies.  In order to engage in thought control, one must be able to attend to 
intrusive thoughts, hold the thought in working memory while planning a strategy to suppress it, 
execute the strategy, and finally, assess the relative success or failure of the strategy.  Thus, it 
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seems crucial to consider the development of executive functions in designing the proposed 
measure.  Anderson et al. (2001) tested adolescents between the ages of 11 and 17 years on a 
wide range of neuropsychological tests designed to assess the various components of executive 
functioning.  The results revealed an overall flat trend of development in the sample with some 
fluctuations in specific skills.  While the study sample did not include children younger than 11 
years, data using 7 and 9 year-olds from a previous study were included for comparison.  The 
addition of this data showed a significant trend for improvement in processing speed and 
attention-shifting around the age of 9 years-old.  Similarly, gains in goal-setting and strategy use 
were noted and became relatively stable around the ages of 11 and 12 years.  Though tentative, 
these results might indicate that before the age of roughly 11 years, the majority of executive 
function skills have not fully developed to where such skills could be applied reliably to the 
complex process of thought suppression.  
1.7 Hypotheses 
The current study aimed to examine the psychometric properties of the TCQ-A, a self-
report measure of thought suppression strategy use among adolescents.  Several hypotheses 
regarding the properties of the measure were made: 1) based upon the five factors of the adult 
TCQ as well as the newly created items intended to measure thought stopping, an exploratory 
factor analysis was predicted to reveal a six-factor structure for the TCQ-A; 2) the hypothesized 
six factors were Distraction, Social, Worry, Punishment, Reappraisal, and Stopping; 3) the TCQ-
A would demonstrate adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability; 4) the TCQ-A 
would show acceptable convergent and discriminant validity.  Specifically, it was hypothesized 
that the total score would have positive correlations with measures of anxiety and depressive 
symptomatology and a negative correlation to internal anxiety control.  It was predicted that the 
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TCQ-A would not be related to externalizing psychopathology, as there is no evidence in theory 
or in the literature to support such a relationship.  Lastly, based upon findings in the adult 
literature, the worry and punishment TCQ-A items were expected to demonstrate criterion 
validity by significantly predicting OCD and GAD symptomatology. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODS 
2.1 Participants and Sample Size 
 Participants were 212 adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18 years with a mean age 
of 15.53 (SD = 2.06).  Given the aforementioned ages at which executive functions and 
metacognitive processes appear to mature, a minimum age limit of 12-years and a maximum 
limit of 18-years was set for the investigation to ensure developmental appropriateness.  
Adolescents were primarily female (67.5%) and were of mainly Caucasian descent (84.4%), with 
the next largest racial groups being African-American (7.1%), Bi-racial/Other (5.2%), and Asian 
(3.3%).  Additionally, 5.7% of the sample self-identified as being of Hispanic origin.   Parents of 
adolescents provided written informed consent and adolescents provided written informed assent 
in accordance with procedures approved by the Louisiana State University Institutional Review 
Board.  Adolescents were excluded from participating if they were unable to understand the 
informed assent process or the constructs of the measures described in Chapter 3.   
  Several recommendations exist for minimum sample sizes required to conduct an 
exploratory factor analysis; however, the recommendations vary greatly.  Some authors suggest a 
set minimum sample size between 150 (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988) and 300 (Comrey & Lee, 
1992; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) individuals.  Other recommendations suggest ideal ratios of 
participants per item, and they range from a minimum of three participants per item (Velicer & 
Fava, 1998) to ten participants per item (Gorsuch, 1983).  The obtained sample size for the 
current investigation is 212 participants, which is a ratio of 8.83 participants per item on the 





2.2 Recruitment and Incentives 
 Adolescents between the ages of 12 and 16 years inclusively were recruited from a 
regional junior-high and high school in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  Participants from the schools 
were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing to win one of three $10 gift cards to an online 
music store.  Upon completion of data collection, three participants were selected using a random 
number generator and were each mailed one gift card.  Adolescents between the ages of 17 years 
and 18 years inclusively were recruited from the LSU undergraduate psychology student 
population and were offered two points of research participation credit as an incentive.  
2.3 Measures 
Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ-A). The TCQ-A is a self-report 
measure designed by the author to assess adolescents’ frequency of engaging in several thought 
control strategies.  The measure is designed to be developmentally appropriate for adolescents 
aged 12-18 years and uses wording of a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 2.5.  The TCQ-A is an 
adaptation of the adult Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994) which 
asked adolescents to rate the frequency of engaging in each thought control statement on a 4-
point Likert-type scale between 0 (never) and 3 (always).  The adult version of the TCQ, as 
opposed to the White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), was chosen as the 
model from which to base the current measure.  The TCQ provides information on the frequency 
of engagement in specific thought suppression strategies, whereas the WBSI does not provide 
such detail.  The adult version of the TCQ derives five subscales purported to measure 
distraction, social, worry, punishment, and reappraisal strategies of thought control.  The 30 
items comprising the adult version demonstrate ecological validity, as they were derived from 
direct patient and non-patient reports of thought control strategies.   
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Twenty items from the adult TCQ were chosen to comprise the five original subscales on 
the new TCQ-A and were reworded to improve developmental appropriateness.  In addition, four 
new items were created for the TCQ-A to assess adolescents’ engagement in thought stopping, a 
theorized sixth subscale for the measure under development.  Thought stopping is a cognitive 
therapeutic technique originally described by Wolpe (1958; 1973) in which clients are asked to 
engage in their typical maladaptive cognitions, such as catastrophic thinking, and are gradually 
taught to interrupt or block those negative trains of thought by speaking or thinking the word 
“stop” and/or attempting to abruptly end the negative thought willfully.  In clinical practice, 
clients are typically then instructed to engage in reappraisal thought control strategies.  Without 
subsequent engagement in reappraisal techniques, thought stopping may become an unspecific or 
counterproductive thought control strategy (Bakker, 2009) and therefore warrants separate 
measurement from reappraisal strategies.  The original adult version of the TCQ did not include 
items relating directly to the act of thought stopping; therefore, the TCQ-A was designed to 
assess Wells and Davies’ five original strategies as well as thought stopping.  Each of the 
theorized six TCQ-A subscales are designed to contain four items as follows: distraction (items 
1, 7, 13, and 19), social (items 2, 8, 14, and 20), worry (items 3, 9, 15, and 21), punishment 
(items 4, 10, 16, and 22), reappraisal (items 5, 11, 17, and 23), and stopping (items 6, 12, 18, and 
24; see appendix for a copy of the TCQ-A).  In addition to the subscales, summing the items on 
the TCQ-A derives a total score designed to assess overall frequency of engagement in any type 
of thought suppression strategy.   
The adult version of the TCQ included some items that required reverse scoring.  To 
eliminate linguistic confusion for adolescents and to simplify scoring and responding, reverse 
scored items were not chosen for inclusion in the TCQ-A.  To test for inconsistent or random 
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responding, an inconsistency index was developed, in which difference scores between sets of 
similar items are summed.  A cut score of eight or higher on the index was chosen as an indicator 
of inconsistent or random responding, due to being approximately half of the total possible 
additive difference scores on the index. This cut-score was chosen based on the commonly used 
Inconsistency Index of the Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children (March, 1998), which 
also uses a recommended cut-score that is roughly half of the total possible index score.  
Difference scores between the following items comprise the TCQ-A inconsistency index: items 2 
and 14, items 3 and 9, items 4 and 16, items 5 and 11, and items 13 and 19.  
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Child Version (OCI-CV). The OCI-CV (Foa et al., 
2010) is a 21-item self-report measure assessing the frequency of OCD symptomatology in 
children and adolescents.  Foa et al. (2010) examined the measure’s reliability and validity in 
children, ranging in age from 7 to 17 years, who met diagnostic criteria for OCD.  The OCI-CV 
was modeled after the adult Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & 
Amir, 1998) and includes a total score as well as six subscales assessing washing, hoarding, 
doubting/checking, ordering, obsessing, and neutralizing subtypes.  Children and adolescents rate 
the frequency of experiencing each item on a 3-point scale between 0 (never) and 2 (always).  
Foa et al. (2010) found the OCI-CV total score and each subscale to have excellent internal 
consistency with alphas ranging from .81 to .85.   The OCI-CV total scale obtained excellent 
internal consistency in the current sample as well (α = .88).  The measure has been demonstrated 
to have adequate to good test-retest reliability for the total score as well as the subscales (rs = 
.60-.89).  The OCI-CV was found to correlate with parent, child, and clinician administered 
measures of OCD as well as child reported anxiety symptomatology broadly, thus demonstrating 
sufficient convergent validity (Foa et al., 2010).  Divergent validity was assessed using child 
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reported depressive symptomatology; however, Foa et al. (2010) note that further study of the 
OCI-CV’s divergent validity is necessary due to strong associations between OCD and 
depression.   
Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children (PSQW-C). The PSWQ-C (Chorpita, 
Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997) is a 14-item self-report measure assessing worry in 
children ranging in age from 6 to 18 years.  Children and adolescents rate their level of 
agreement with each item on a 4-point Likert-type scale between 0 (not at all true) and 3 (always 
true).  Previous studies including clinical and nonclinical samples have reported acceptable to 
excellent internal consistency with alphas ranging from .76 to .90 (Chorpita et al., 1997; 
Laugesen, Dugas, & Bukowski, 2003; Muris, Meesters, & Gobel, 2001; Muris, Meesters, 
Merckelbach, & Hülsenbeck, 2000).  Internal consistency in the current sample was poor (α = 
.43).  The PSWQ-C has been shown to have excellent test-retest reliability and sufficient 
convergent and divergent validity (Chorpita et al., 1997; Muris et al., 2001).  
Anxiety Control Questionnaire-Child Form (ACQ-C). The ACQ-C (Weems, Silverman, 
Rapee, & Pina, 2003) is a 30-item self-report measure assessing children’s perceived control 
over external and internal experiences of anxiety.  The ACQ-C yields a total score, as well as an 
internal reactions score and an external reactions score.  Children rate their level of agreement 
with each item on a 4-point Likert-type scale from 0 (none) to 4 (very, very much) with lower 
scores indicating less perceived control.  Weems et al. previously demonstrated excellent internal 
consistency for the total score as well as the two subscales in clinical and nonclinical samples of 
children aged 9 to 17 years (α ≥ .86; Weems et al., 2003).  Internal consistency in the current 
sample was equally high (α = .92).  Similarly, the ACQ-C was found to significantly correlate 
with self-reported anxiety and a measure assessing children’s locus of control, thus 
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demonstrating adequate convergent validity (Weems et al., 2003).  Test-retest reliability has not 
yet been assessed in the ACQ-C. 
Youth Self Report form (YSR). The YSR (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001) is a 112-item 
self-report scale assessing behavioral and emotional concerns in children ages 11 to 18 years.  
The YSR contains several subscales, however only the Anxious/Depressed, Thought Problems, 
Internalizing Problems, Attention Problems, and Delinquent Behavior subscales were used to 
examine convergent and discriminate validity.  In previous studies, internal consistencies for the 
YSR subscales have been found to be in the adequate to excellent range (αs = .78-.90; 
Achenbach & Rescorla, 2001).  Internal consistency for the total measure in the current sample 
was excellent (αs = .93).  Likewise, studies have demonstrated that the YSR subscales have good 
test-retest reliability (rs = .78-.88).  The YSR has been found to have adequate criterion-related 
validity by significantly discriminating between clinically referred and non-referred children on 
each of the subscales of interest in the current investigation.  Similarly, the YSR subscales of 
interest to the present investigation have been shown to significantly correlate with relevant 
DSM-IV diagnoses, thus demonstrating adequate convergent validity (Achenbach & Rescorla, 
2001). 
2.4 Procedures 
 The current investigation was reviewed and approved by the Louisiana State University 
Institutional Review Board.  Parental consent forms were provided to all students enrolled in 6th 
to 8th grade physical education, 9th to 10th grade health science, or 9th grade computing courses.  
Those students with returned and signed parental consent forms were asked to provide written 
assent on the day of data collection.  Students whose parent/guardian provided consent and who 
themselves provided assent were administered the aforementioned measures during their 
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respective course periods in groups of 10-30 students.  Upon completion of the packet of 
measures, students were then provided with a second copy of the TCQ-A, along with a pre-
addressed and stamped envelope, and were provided with instructions for returning the 
completed measure in approximately two weeks after their initial participation. 
 University undergraduate students scheduled themselves to attend an experiment session 
with this researcher in a classroom on the LSU campus.  Students who were 18 years of age 
provided informed consent; students who were 17 years of age provided a copy of a signed 
parental research participation waiver and provided written assent to participate.  Study sessions 
were held in groups of 5-15 students.  Students were administered the questionnaire packet and 
were then given instructions to complete and return a second copy of the TCQ-A in 
approximately two weeks following their initial participation.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
3.1 Response Style Validity Check and Missing Value Procedures 
 The previously described inconsistency index from the TCQ-A was examined to ensure 
the validity of response styles for all subsequent analyses.  Two participants scored at or above 
the cut score of eight and were therefore excluded from subsequent reliability and validity 
analyses.  A cut score of eight was viewed as a conservative estimate of inconsistent responding 
due to being approximately half of the total possible additive difference scores on the index.  
Missing values for all measures were replaced by the means of the remaining items 
within the same subscale or from the total measure for measures without subscales.  Missing 
values were only replaced if fewer than 10% of the items from the measure were missing.  Four 
participants were excluded from subsequent analyses due to missing more than 10% of the items 
on the TCQ-A, thereby making missing value replacement unwarranted.  As a result, the sample 
included 206 adolescents. 
3.2 Clinical Status of Sample 
 Due to community, as opposed to clinic-referred, recruitment methods, it was likely that 
the obtained participants would compose a primarily non-clinical sample.  The current battery of 
measures cannot definitively ascertain diagnostic status for any mental health disorder.  
However, clinical indices from the included measures were examined for preliminary evidence 
of participants’ clinical status.  First, t-scores from the Anxious/Depressed, Attention Problems, 
Internalizing Problems, and Externalizing Problems subscales of the YSR were examined as 
possible indicators of clinical psychopathology.  Twenty-three participants (10.85%) were 
identified with t-scores of 70 or greater on any of the aforementioned subscales, generally 
indicating statistically significant psychopathology endorsement.  Twenty participants (9.43%) 
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demonstrated statistically elevated scores on either the Anxious/Depressed or Internalizing 
Problems subscales, indicating symptom endorsements potentially consistent with either anxiety 
or depression.   An additional three participants (1.41%) demonstrated elevated scores on the 
Attention Problems subscale, indicating symptom endorsements potentially consistent with 
attention or behavior disorders.  No participant demonstrated a t-score of 70 or greater on the 
Externalizing Problems subscale.  The mean t-scores from the YSR subscales indicated that the 
overall sample did not show clinical elevations on any of the aforementioned subscales: 
Anxious/Depressed = 55.50 (SD = 6.79), Attention Problems = 56.40 (SD = 7.22), Internalizing 
Disorders = 51.53 (SD = 11.09), and Externalizing Disorders = 49.83 (SD = 8.45). 
Second, total scores from the OCI-CV and PSWQ-C were examined and compared to 
prior research performed with clinical samples of children and adolescents with OCD and GAD 
respectively.  Foa and colleagues (2010) found a mean OCI-CV total score of 10.16 (SD = 7.58) 
following cognitive-behavioral therapy for OCD in a sample of 109 children and adolescents.  
Therefore, a score of 10 or greater was considered of possible clinical significance in the current 
sample, though the authors have not developed a formal clinical cut-score on the OCI-CV.  The 
current sample included 92 participants (43.40%) who scored above a total score of 10 on the 
OCI-CV.  The mean OCI-CV total score in the present sample was 10.60 (SD = 6.88) indicating 
that, the sample as a whole appeared approximately consistent with the scores of youth who were 
considered to be OCD treatment responders. 
Lastly, total scores from the PSWQ-C were examined and compared to the mean total 
score of adolescents with a diagnosis of GAD in previous research (24.09; SD = 9.85; Pestle, 
Chorpita, & Schiffman, 2008).  For the current sample, 173 participants (81.60%) scored above 
14.24 (one standard deviation below the mean score obtain by Pestle and colleagues).   The mean 
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PSWQ-C score in the current sample was 18.28 (SD = 4.24), indicating that the sample as a 
whole endorsed higher levels of worry than expected but less than a demographically 
comparable GAD sample.  
3.3 Demonstration of Intrusive Thought Experiences 
 To demonstrate that adolescents in the current sample experienced intrusive or unwanted 
thoughts, even in the absence of clinical disorders, items from the OCI-CV and PSWQ-C were 
chosen for their face-validity in measuring negative thought experiences.  Endorsements of 
“sometimes” or greater on the following items from the OCI-CV were considered as evidence of 
intrusive thought experiences: “1. I think about bad things and I can’t stop” and “11. I get upset 
by bad thoughts.”  Endorsements of “sometimes true” or greater on the following items from the 
PSWQ-C were likewise considered as evidence of intrusive worries or negative thought 
experiences: “1. My worries really bother me” and “12. I notice that I have been worrying about 
things.”   Of the obtained sample, 42.1% (N = 90) endorsed both items on the OCI-CV at a level 
of “sometimes” or greater and 70.3% (N = 149) endorsed both items on the PSWQ-C at a level 
of “sometimes true” or greater, indicating that despite the lack of clinical diagnoses in the 
sample, the majority of participants reported experiencing intrusive thoughts that would be the 
target of thought suppression efforts.   
3.4 Preliminary Analyses 
 A factorial analysis of variance was used to test for sample demographic influences on 
total TCQ-A scores.  The examined sample characteristics were gender, race, recruitment 
method (i.e., undergraduates vs. middle and high school students), and age (median split of the 
age range).  No significant main effects were found for any of the aforementioned variables.  
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Therefore, all subsequent analyses were performed using the entire included sample, with no 
corrections for demographic variables. 
3.5 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
A principal factor analysis (PFA) using the oblique promax rotation procedure was 
performed to determine the factor structure of the TCQ-A.  Principal factor analysis was chosen 
due to producing better approximations of confirmatory factor analytic results compared to 
component analyses (see Floyd & Widaman, 1995).  Promax rotation was employed to account 
for inter-factor correlations given that the theoretical constructs of the subscales are not 
orthogonal.  Using the Kaiser Criterion, only factors with eigenvalues equal to or greater than 
one were considered.  Additionally, a scree plot, the number of items loading on each factor (i.e. 
minimum of 3; Kline, 1994), and the six theoretical subscales of the TCQ-A were considered in 
determining the interpretability of the factor solution.  In the initial PFA, seven factors were 
extracted with eigenvalues of one ore greater; however, the last three extracted factors contained 
fewer than three items each.  Additionally, an examination of the scree plot supported a five-
factor solution and an examination of the item loadings did not conform to theoretical 
expectations.   
Due to the poor factor structure of the 24-item version of the TCQ-A, items were 
examined for removal to improve the factor solution.  Retaining or removing items was decided 
by examining items’ theoretical importance, setting a minimum factor loading standard of .30 
(Cattell, 1973), and an assessment of item communalities.  All four items from the stopping 
subscale initially loaded with items on the distraction subscale.  Due to the stopping subscale’s 
redundancy in measurement with distraction, items 6, 12, 18, and 24 were removed and a second 
PFA was performed with the remaining 20 items.  The second PFA again revealed seven factors 
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with eigenvalues greater than one.  As with the initial analysis, an examination of the scree plot 
as well as the number of items loading on each factor revealed a five-factor solution.  Removing 
the four items from the stopping subscale did not improve upon the interpretability of the TCQ-
A’s factor structure beyond removing redundant items.  Therefore, additional items were 
considered for removal.  After examining item communalities, items 8 and 22 were identified as 
problematic due to having low communalities.  Additionally, items 1 and 20 were considered 
problematic due to either poor or multiple factor loadings.  Upon examining the theoretical 
importance of items 1, 8, 20, and 22, it was decided that items 1, 20, and 22 should be removed, 
while item 8 should be retained due to theoretical importance and to maintain a minimum 
number of items necessary to create a social factor (i.e. removing both items 8 and 22 would 
leave only two items assessing social methods of thought suppression).  To maintain a consistent 
number of items on all theorized subscales, the single items with the lowest factor loadings from 
the distraction, reappraisal, and worry subscales were also removed (items 15 and 17).   
After removing problematic items, a third PFA was computed with the revised 15-item 
version of the TCQ-A, revealing five factors with eigenvalues greater than one.  An examination 
of the scree plot further supported the five-factor solution.  All items theorized to comprise the 
five remaining subscales loaded together onto individual factors, with the exception of item 10 
(punishment), which loaded equivalently on two factors along with items from the worry and 
reappraisal subscales respectively.  Therefore, item 10 was removed from the measure and the 
final factor structure achieved with the 14-item version of the TCQ-A replicated that previously 
achieved, and accounted for 46.95% of the variance.  Item factor loadings and communalities are 




TCQ-A Factor Loadings and Item Communalities 
Item Factor Loadings 
 1 2 3 4 5 CM 
(7) I think about something good or happy instead. .72 -.03 .019 -.03 -.09 .51 
(13) I work on something instead (like homework 
or chores).  
.70 .02 -.01 -.01 .21 .52 
(19) I focus on something else. .69 -.00 -.05 .04 -.03 .49 
(11) I ask myself if the thought is really true. -.11 .84 -.10 .02 .09 .68 
(5) I ask myself if the thought is really all that bad. -.03 .60 .14 -.01 -.11 .40 
(23) I tell myself, “it’s okay, it’s just a thought.”  .20 .58 .07 -.04 -.09 .45 
(2) I ask a friend if they have similar thoughts. -.04 .01 .81 .04 .04 .67 
(14) I talk to a friend about the thought. -.05 -.00 .76 .00 .05 .58 
(8) I talk to an adult about the thought (like a 
parent, teacher, coach, or pastor/rabbi). 
.14 .16 .34 -.03 -.04 .21 
(9) I worry about something else instead. .07 -.15 .05 .76 -.06 .55 
(21) I think about a smaller problem I’m having 
instead. 
.07 .07 -.00 .54 -.07 .33 
(3) I think about something else that’s negative or 
bad. 
-.19 .10 -.03 .46 .11 .28 
(16) I punish myself for having the thought. .02 -.10 .07 -.07 .82 .62 
(4) I get mad or frustrated at myself for having the 
thought. 
.09 .17 -.06 .19 .37 .30 
Note: CM = communalities; TCQ-A = Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire; (#) denotes 
item numbers from the original 24-item measure. 
 
Due to removing item 10, the fifth factor (punishment) contained only two items, thus not 
meeting the minimum standard of three items comprising a factor.  However, due to the 
relatively parsimonious factor solution obtained otherwise, the factor structure achieved with the 
revised 14-item version of the TCQ-A was considered interpretable.  Based upon factor content, 
the five factors obtained were labeled thusly: factor 1 = “Distraction,” factor 2 = “Reappraisal,” 
factor 3 = “Social,” factor 4 = “Worry,” and factor 5 = “Punishment.”  To ensure common 
measurement within the factors, the subscales were examined in individual PFAs and all were 
found to be unifactoral. 
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3.6 Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability 
The following reliability and validity analyses were performed using the 14-item TCQ-A.  
Internal consistency for the overall measure, as well as each identified factor, was assessed using 
Chronbach’s alpha.  The total measure achieved adequate internal consistency (α = .74).  Each 
subscale individually obtained questionable to adequate internal consistency (α’s = .59-.72), with 
the exception of Punishment, which demonstrated unacceptable internal consistency in the 
obtained samples (α = .46).  Internal consistencies for all scales are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Internal Consistency and Test-Retest Reliability of the TCQ-A 
 Internal Consistency  
(N = 205) 
Test-Retest Reliability  
(N = 86) 
Total .74 .69** 
Distraction .72 .52** 
Reappraisal .69 .67** 
Social .69 .64** 
Worry .59 .42** 
Punishment .46 .72** 
Note: **p < .01; TCQ-A = Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire. 
 
Test-retest reliability was assessed using a Pearson product-moment correlation between 
the first and second administrations of the measure for the total score, as well as each subscale 
individually. Test-retest reliability correlations are presented in Table 2.  A 40.57% (N = 86) 
return rate for the second administration of the TCQ-A was obtained.  Correlations between the 
initial and one-to-two week delayed administrations of the TCQ-A were moderate for the total 
score (r = .69) and were moderate to strong for the individual subscales (rs = .42-.72).   
3.7 Construct Validity 
To assess each subscale’s construct validity, Pearson product moment correlations were 
computed between the total score and each subscale and among the individual subscales. 
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Subscale intercorrelations are presented in Table 3.  All subscales correlations with the total 
score were strong (rs = .58 - .73), suggesting each measures the broad construct of thought 
suppression.  Correlations among the subscales were weak to moderate (rs = .11 - .31), 
suggesting that the subscales are loosely related but that each measures a unique thought 
suppression strategy.   
Table 3 
Intercorrelations Among TCQ-A Subscales 
 Distraction Reappraisal Social Worry Punishment 
Distraction -     
Reappraisal          .25** -    
Social          .12 .31** -   
Worry          .19** .26** .24** -  
Punishment          .11  .19**  .19**  .27**  - 
Total          .61** .72** .62** .58** .42**  
Note: **p < .01; TCQ-A = Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire. 
 
3.8 Convergent Validity 
Pearson product moment correlations between the TCQ-A and measures of theoretically 
related symptomatology were performed to assess convergent validity and are presented in Table 
4.  Previous research with adults has shown that engagement in thought suppression – and worry 
and punishment suppression strategies in particular – is associated with OCD and GAD 
symptomatology (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Coles & Heimberg, 2005; Tolin et al., 2007; Wells & 
Carter, 2009).  Therefore, correlations with the TCQ-A and measures of worry and obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (i.e. OCI-CV and PSWQ-C) were examined for evidence of convergent 
validity.  The TCQ-A total score, as well as all five subscales significantly correlated with 
measures of OCD and worry symptomatology; however, total score and worry and punishment 
subscales primarily demonstrated correlations of a meaningful magnitude.  The observed 
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correlations with the OCI-CV and PSWQ-C are suggestive that worry and punishment thought 
suppression types – and overall engagement in thought suppression – is associated with anxious 
psychopathology in adolescents, a finding that replicates such associations in the adult literature.    
Table 4 
Convergent and Divergent Validity Correlations 
 TCQ-A 
Total 
Distraction Reappraisal Social Worry Punishment 
OCI-CV total     .47**      .20**        .31**        .15*      .42**        .51** 




   -.21** 
 
     .03 
 
      -.07 
 
      -.08 
 
    -.33** 
 




    .35** 
 
     .18** 
 
       .15* 
 
       .04 
 
     .40** 
 
      .51** 
Thought Px.     .21**      .07        .10        .07      .22**       .30** 
Internalizing     .34**      .18**        .15*        .04      .38**       .50** 
Attn. Px.     .10     -.02        .08        .02      .19**       .09 
Delinquent     .11     -.08        .13        .06      .12       .16* 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; TCQ-A = Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire; OCI-CV = 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Child Version; PSWQ-C = Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
for Children; ACQ-C = Anxiety Control Questionnaire for Children; YSR = Youth Self Report 
inventory; Anx/Dep = Anxious/Depressed subscale; Attn. Px. = Attention Problems subscale. 
 
Further, thought suppression has been shown to be associated with other internalizing 
disorders such as major depression, PTSD, and specific phobias among adult samples (Muris, 
Merchelbeck, Horselenberg, Sijsenaar, & Leeuw, 1997; Reynolds & Wells, 1999).  Therefore, 
correlations with internalizing disorder symptoms on the YSR (i.e. anxious/depressed and 
internalizing subscales) were examined for evidence of convergent validity.  A relationship 
between the TCQ-A and the thought problems subscale of the YSR was also examined, as many 
of the items comprising the thought problems subscale are similar in type to symptoms of OCD 
and intrusive thought experiences broadly.  All three YSR subscales significantly correlated with 
the TCQ-A total score as well as the worry and punishment subscales, again suggesting that 
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worry and punishment thought suppression strategies are associated with internalizing 
psychopathology in adolescents.  Interestingly, no correlations were seen between the YSR 
internalizing, anxious/depressed, or thought problems subscales and the reappraisal or social 
subscales of the TCQ-A, which suggests that reappraisal and social methods of thought control 
may not be indicative of internalizing psychopathology. 
Lastly, correlations between the ACQ-C internal subscale and TCQ-A total score and 
each subscale were examined for convergent validity due to the two measures’ similar constructs 
of controlling internal experiences of anxiety and/or anxious cognitions.  As the ACQ-C yields 
higher scores for greater anxiety control, it was expected that negative correlations would be 
found between the TCQ-A and the ACQ-C internal scale.  The TCQ-A total score as well as the 
worry and punishment subscales significantly and negatively correlated with the internal 
subscales of the ACQ-C.  Correlations with the distraction, social, and reappraisal subscales were 
not significant. 
3.9 Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining correlations between the TCQ-A total 
score and the attention problems and delinquent behavior subscales of the YSR as there is little 
theoretical basis for a relationship to exist between externalizing cognitions and behaviors and 
internalizing cognitive processes such as thought suppression (see Table 4).  The attention 
problems subscale of the YSR was of particular interest when demonstrating discriminant 
validity, as it is necessary to establish that adolescents’ reports of thought suppression on the 
TCQ-A do not simply reflect poor attentional resources.  As expected, measures of externalizing 
symptomatology did not correlate with the TCQ-A total score or any subscale, with the 
exception of the worry subscale, which was weakly associated with attention problems.  
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3.10 Criterion Validity 
Cognitive models of OCD and GAD have included thought suppression engagement as 
an important variable in the development and/or maintenance of those disorders (Ehlers & Steil, 
1995; Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis, 1996; Wells, 1995; Wenzloff et al., 1988).  Specifically, adult 
researchers of thought suppression and anxiety have theorized that worry and punishment 
thought control strategies are particularly implicated in OCD and GAD.  Therefore, the TCQ-A’s 
criterion validity was assessed by examining multiple regression analyses using the total scale as 
well as each subscale as predictors of worry frequency on the PSWQ-C and obsessions on the 
OCI-CV.  As expected, the TCQ-A total score predicted and explained a significant proportion 
of the variance in obsessive-compulsive symptoms on the OCI-CV, β = .47, t(204) = 7.57, p < 
.01, R2 = .22, F(1, 204) = 57.23, p < .01.  The total score similarly predicted and explained a 
significant amount of the variance in worry frequency on the PSWQ-C, β = .44, t(205) = 6.96, p 
< .01, R2 = .19, F(1, 205) = 48.43, p < .01. 
All five subscales of the TCQ-A were stepwise entered into two regression models 
separately predicting OCI-CV and PSWQ-C scores.  While it was expected that Worry and 
Punishment would significantly predict obsessive-compulsive and generalized anxiety 
symptomatology, Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal thought control methods were included in 
the models to illustrate Worry and Punishment’s unique predictive value above that of neutral or 
adaptive thought suppression strategies.  The overall model for obsessive-compulsive traits was 
significant, F(3, 202) = 39.32, p < . 01.  Punishment (β = .41, p < .01), Worry (β = .27, p < .01), 
and Reappraisal (β = .16, p < .01) significantly accounted for 36.9% of the variance of OCI-CV 
total scores collectively.  Likewise, the model for generalized anxiety traits was significant, F(2, 
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205) = 52.50, p < .01.  Punishment (β = .40, p < .01) and Worry (β = .33, p < .01) significantly 
accounted for 33.9% of the variance in PSWQ-C total scores.   
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CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
While an abundance of studies have examined thought suppression effects and correlates 
in adult samples, virtually nothing is known of thought suppression among youth.  Both limited 
attention given to cognitive processes in child and adolescent psychopathology broadly, as well 
as the lack of an empirically derived and validated instrument to measure thought suppression in 
youth, have likely contributed to the scarcity of adolescent thought suppression research.  
Therefore, to begin the process of filling the gap in the literature, the current investigation 
presents the initial psychometric properties of the Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire 
(TCQ-A), an adaptation of the adult Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 
1994).  Due to Wells and Davies’ original methodology of item development, the 14 items on the 
revised TCQ-A demonstrate ecological validity in that the thought control techniques that each 
item assesses were derived from direct patient and non-patient reports of thought suppression 
strategies.  Likewise, the adult version of the TCQ has been shown to be reliable and valid with a 
stable factor structure in clinical and non-clinical adult samples (Wells & Davies, 1994; 
Reynolds & Wells, 1999) and therefore served as an empirically tested model from which to base 
the TCQ-A items.  
For the TCQ-A, an attempt was made to address a missing theoretical thought control 
technique on the adult TCQ by including four newly developed items intended to tap the 
construct of thought stopping.  It was expected that the 24-item version of the TCQ-A would 
demonstrate a six-factor structure, which would consist of items measuring distraction, social, 
worry, punishment, reappraisal, and stopping thought suppression strategies respectively.  
However, an initial principal factor analysis revealed a poor factor structure with many items 
showing statistically and theoretically problematic factor loadings, namely the newly created 
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Stopping thought control items.  After removing the four stopping items as well as six other 
problematic items, the 14-item version of the TCQ-A achieved a factor solution that conformed 
to theoretical expectations and replicated the five-factor structure from the adult TCQ (Wells & 
Davies, 1994).   The final five-factor solution accounted for an equivalent proportion of variance 
(46.96%) compared to that explained by the adult version in a non-clinical sample (42%; Wells 
& Davies, 1994).  In addition to replicating the factor structure of the parent measure, the TCQ-
A has the benefit of being shorter, with only 14 items as compared to the original 30 from the 
adult version.  Therefore, the TCQ-A has the advantages of being less cumbersome and quicker 
to administer for younger respondents such as adolescents. 
4.1 Reliability 
Overall, the current examination of the psychometric properties of the newly developed 
TCQ-A demonstrated that adolescents as young at 12 years of age were able to report upon their 
engagement in distinct thought suppression techniques using the measure.  The TCQ-A 
demonstrated adequate evidence of internal consistency that was approximately equivalent to 
reliability findings in the adult version (Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Wells & Davies, 1994).  
Internal consistencies for the total scale as well as the Distraction, Reappraisal, and Social 
subscales were in the questionable-to-adequate range and test-retest reliability was moderate to 
strong.  Internal consistency for the Worry and Punishment subscales were unacceptable and 
were likely due to poor subscale and/or item constructions for those measures (i.e. only two 
items comprising the Punishment scale).  The reliability results observed in the current study are 
not unexpected when considering factors of cognitive development in adolescents that might 
forecast lower reliabilities of self-reported metacognitive processes given ongoing neurological 
development such as executive functioning.  Improving the internal consistency of the overall 
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measure as well as the Worry and Punishment subscales specifically should be a chief focus of 
future research with the TCQ-A and could potentially be achieved by creating new, 
developmentally appropriate items to include in the subscales. 
4.2 Validity 
Construct validity of the Adolescent Thought Control Questionnaire was assessed in 
several ways.  The TCQ-A demonstrated moderate to strong intercorrelations between the total 
score and the five subscales, indicating that each subscale is significantly related to the broader 
construct of thought suppression.  However, intercorrelations among the individual subscales 
were weak to moderate, therefore suggesting that each measures a unique method of suppressing 
unwanted thoughts.  The only intercorrelations of any meaningful magnitude, despite more 
achieving statistical but not practical significance, were observed between the Social and 
Reappraisal subscales, the Worry and Reappraisal subscales, and between the Worry and 
Punishment subscales.  Moderate to weak relationships between the aforementioned subscales 
conform to theoretical conceptualizations of each suppression method.  For example, Wells and 
Davies originally believed the Social and Reappraisal subscales indicated positive or adaptive 
methods of thought control, not typically associated with psychopathology (1994).  Later 
correlational studies of thought suppression techniques and psychopathology, such as GAD, 
OCD, PTSD, and depression, have supported the conceptualization of social and reappraisal 
thought control methods as being adaptive (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Reynolds & Wells, 1999).   
Similarly, Worry and Punishment suppression methods were believed to indicate negative or 
maladaptive coping strategies for managing unpleasant thoughts (Wells & Davies, 1994) and 
were found to be positively related to psychopathology in several investigations (Abramowitz et 
al., 2003; Reynolds & Wells, 1999; Tolin et al., 2007).   In the current sample, the TCQ-A 
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demonstrated significant positive correlations between the Worry and Punishment subscales and 
measures of internalizing disorder symptomatology (i.e. OCI-CV, PSWQ-C, ACQ-C, and YSR 
subscales).  Therefore, the TCQ-A conforms to previous findings in adult samples of relations 
between maladaptive thought control strategies and reports of elevated of internalizing 
symptoms.  Unlike previous research with adults, no significant negative correlations were 
observed between the so-called adaptive thought suppression techniques (i.e. Social and 
Reappraisal) and measures of psychopathology.  Instead, no correlation or, in some cases, 
positive correlations were observed (though arguably these correlations were of a weak 
magnitude).  While such findings clearly require replication before conclusions can be 
definitively drawn, the overall lack of associations between measures of psychopathology and 
positive thought control strategies measured by the TCQ-A suggests that adolescents may not 
show positive coping by engaging in thought suppression as has been demonstrated in adults.  
Rather, these preliminary results suggest that only neutral (i.e. Distraction, Social, and 
Reappraisal) or negative coping – via Worry and Punishment thought control methods – is seen 
among adolescents.  If replicated in future research, the strong associations between negative 
thought control strategies and increased reports of internalizing symptomatology may indicate a 
partial etiological pathway for the development of internalizing problems and should be explored 
as such in subsequent research.   
In addition to subscale intercorrelations, content validity was also considered when 
designing the TCQ-A and assessing its subsequent construct validity.  When adapting the adult 
TCQ for use with adolescents, an attempt was made to improve the content validity of the 
measure by including an additional thought control technique missing from the original measure 
(i.e. thought stopping).  Wells and Davies’ ecologically valid method of deriving items to tap all 
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theorized thought control techniques provided a rather exhaustive item pool, covering a variety 
of suppression methodologies, thus showing initially high content validity despite the lack of 
thought stopping measurement.  Nevertheless, recent empirical and clinical attention garnered by 
thought stopping therapeutic techniques (see Bakker, 2009) warranted an attempt to include the 
construct in the TCQ-A.  The items created to measure thought stopping performed poorly when 
examining the results of the exploratory factor analysis; all four thought stopping items loaded 
highly with Distraction items, creating measurement redundancy and clearly demonstrating that 
the new items did not measure the intended construct.  There are several possibilities for the poor 
performance of the thought stopping items, the most likely of which was poor item construction.  
The four items comprising the initial thought stopping subscale were as follows: “I try to push 
the thought out of my head,” “I try to block-out the thought,” “I try hard not to think about the 
thought again in the future,” and “I try hard to avoid thinking about the thought.”  The original 
intent of the four stopping items was to tap dual aspects of thought stopping, both the initial act 
of stopping the thought (i.e., “pushing” the thought from one’s consciousness) as well as 
avoiding or preventing the thought’s return.  An objective re-examination of the aforementioned 
stopping items suggests significant overlap with distraction techniques, as thought avoidance will 
often involve distraction methods.  Likewise, items truly measuring clinical thought stopping 
methodologies (i.e. saying or thinking the word “stop”) were not included initially, as it was 
believed that such acts would demonstrate a low base rate in non-clinical samples.  Therefore, 
the four newly created items seem to have high content overlap with Distraction thought control 
methods and low content validity for the originally intended subscale of thought stopping.  Due 
to their poor performance and redundancy with Distraction items, the thought stopping items 
were removed from the final version of the TCQ-A, which, along with removing some other 
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problematic items, improved the overall factor structure and objectively assessed content validity 
of the measure.   
A third component of construct validity, concurrent validity, was difficult to assess, as no 
other measures of thought suppression currently exist for use with children or adolescents.  
Therefore, relations to theoretically similar constructs of psychopathology were examined for 
evidence of concurrent validity.  The TCQ-A was examined for relationships to measures of 
internalizing disorders broadly, as well as OCD and GAD specifically, as cognitive models of 
such disorders suggest that thought suppression engagement is a developmental and/or 
maintaining factor.  Wells and Davies (1994) chose to examine similar constructs among non-
clinical samples when initially testing the psychometrics of the adult TCQ and therefore, 
concurrent validity between the adult and adolescent versions can be reasonably compared.  
Overall, the TCQ-A total score showed significant relationships with measures of internalizing 
psychopathology on the OCI-CV, PSWQ-C, and YSR subscales.  The specific subscales were 
also investigated for relations to psychopathology; however, as stated previously, only the Worry 
and Punishment subscales showed practically and statistically significant relationships to such 
measures, indicating that Worry and Punishment may be indicative of maladaptive coping and/or 
pathological cognitive processes.  Likewise, as expected, the total score as well as the Worry and 
Punishment subscales were shown to have significant negative correlations with self-reported 
anxiety control on the ACQ-C, suggesting that increased efficacy for anxiety control is 
negatively associated with the frequency of engagement in overall though suppression as well as 
maladaptive thought suppression strategies specifically.  
Contrary to expectations, the Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal thought suppression 
strategies did not correlate with measures of psychopathology with any practical significance.  
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Two possibilities for the lack of such correlational evidence of convergent validity exists.  First, 
it is possible that engagement in Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal thought suppression 
strategies are not indicative of positive or negative cognitive coping in adolescents (unlike the 
evidence found in adult samples).  A second possibility is that a negative relationship to 
psychopathology could not be observed in the current study due to the lack of a clinical 
comparison sample.  The absence of significant correlations with the Distraction, Social, and 
Reappraisal subscales is problematic for demonstrating adequate convergent validity for those 
subscales.  Therefore scores on the Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal subscales should be 
interpreted with caution until future investigations are able to demonstrate evidence of their 
convergent validity, particularly by examining their psychometric properties in a clinical sample.  
Despite the lack of convergent validity for some subscales, the overall frequency of engagement 
in thought suppression as well as the maladaptive forms of suppression (i.e. Worry and 
Punishment) show adequate concurrent validity with measures of obsessions, worry, anxiety 
control, and internalizing symptoms and performed similarly to the psychometrics of the adult 
TCQ (see Wells & Davies, 1994).    
Discriminant validity has not been assessed by any researcher investigating the 
psychometric properties of the adult TCQ and is therefore an important consideration when 
examining the construct validity of the adolescent adaptation.  Initial evidence of the TCQ-A’s 
concurrent validity indicates that broad thought suppression is related to internalizing 
symptomatology, as predicted by cognitive theories of psychopathology.  However, it remains 
important to demonstrate the lack of associations to theoretically distinct psychopathology such 
as externalizing behaviors (i.e. delinquent behaviors and attention problems).  Therefore, the 
TCQ-A total score and each subscale were examined for correlations to measures of 
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externalizing disorder symptomatology on the YSR.  Results overwhelming suggested that no 
relationship existed between the two constructs, with the exception of a weak positive correlation 
between Worry thought control strategies and the attention problems subscale of the YSR.  The 
weak relationship noted between Worry and attention problems was not unexpected given 
similar clinical presentations of inattention and pathological worry (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007).  Therefore, it appears that thought suppression indeed demonstrated adequate 
relationships to theoretically similar pathological constructs but that it was not related to all 
psychopathology.  Also important to note is that problems with attention specifically, were not 
associated with thought suppression engagement, suggesting that low attentional resources due to 
executive functioning development or attention-related pathology, such as Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, did not appear to influence responding on the TCQ-A. 
Lastly, criterion validity was considered when assessing the TCQ-A’s overall construct 
validity.  Due to the lack of a clinical comparison sample, clinical vs. non-clinical status 
predictions could not be assessed in the current investigation.  Therefore, the TCQ-A’s ability to 
predict non-clinical symptomatology endorsements was assessed to provide the best analog 
evidence of criterion validity.  Due to theoretical expectations of though suppression’s relations 
to OCD and GAD, it was expected that total engagement in thought suppression, as well as 
maladaptive thought suppression strategies specifically (i.e. Worry and Punishment), would 
significantly predict obsessions and worries above neutral or adaptive thought control methods 
(i.e. Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal).  The total frequency of engagement in thought 
suppression as well as both the Worry and Punishment strategies each predicted OCI-CV and 
PSWQ-C scores as expected.  Generalized anxiety traits were significantly predicted by 
maladaptive thought suppression strategies only; thus, the constructs of the Worry and 
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Punishment subscales on the TCQ-A conform to previous theoretical conceptions from the adult 
TCQ.  Further, the PSWQ-C regression model demonstrated that neutral or adaptive thought 
suppression strategies on the TCQ-A did not significantly predict worry symptomatology.   
As expected obsessive-compulsive traits were also significantly predicted by Worry and 
Punishment thought suppression; however, the regression model also included Reappraisal 
thought control methods as a significant predictor, a finding that was not expected given 
theoretical conceptualizations of Reappraisal being an adaptive thought control strategy not 
typically associated with psychopathology.  Despite theoretical expectations, it stands to reason 
that, particularly in a non-clinical sample, subclinical increases in OCD symptomatology are 
associated with adaptive thought control methods like reappraisal.  In a non-clinical sample, 
engagement in Reappraisal thought control methods may be effective for reducing intrusive 
cognitions measured by the OCI-CV due to the absence of thought-action-fusion cognitive 
distortions (see Rachman & Safran, 1999).  The increases in reappraisal techniques seen in this 
non-clinical sample may be due to minimal-to-mild beliefs in the validity of obsessional 
thoughts, thereby making engagement in reappraisal non-threatening to core beliefs.  Clinical 
populations may reduce engagement in reappraisal strategies due to prominent and distorted 
beliefs in the validity of obsessional thoughts and the utility of compulsive acts via thought-
action-fusion processes that are reduced in subclinical samples.   
4.3 Limitations and Future Directions 
While the psychometric analysis of the TCQ-C, overall, indicated adequate to good 
reliability and validity for the total measure, the current investigation was limited in several 
ways.  The most notable limitation was the lower than expected internal consistencies for the 
individual subscales.  The total scale achieved adequate internal reliability; however, only the 
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Distraction, Reappraisal, and Social subscales achieved adequate internal reliabilities, which 
severely limited the subsequent interpretation of the Worry and Punishment subscales.  The 
punishment subscale in particular was comprised of only two items, which was likely reducing 
the internal consistency of that scale due to lack of repeated measurement of the construct.  
Additionally, there was evidence that the obtained sample potentially demonstrated a poor 
understanding of the concept of worry broadly, which may have contributed to poor reliability.  
The poor internal consistency of the PSWQ-C and the Worry subscale of the TCQ-A in the 
present sample suggested that the obtained sample broadly responded inconsistently for the 
concept of worry.  Further evidence of poor worry concept was that the PSWQ-C achieved good 
internal consistencies in previous research (Chorpita et al. 1997: Pestle et al. 2008) and the 
present sample showed relatively consistent responding for measures of concepts other than 
worry.  Additionally, the sample, overall, scored somewhat comparably to a clinical sample on 
the PSWQ-C (see Pestle et al. 2008); however, few substantial elevations on the 
Anxious/Depressed or Internalizing Problems subscales of the YSR were noted that would 
support such elevated reports of worry.  The discrepant reporting of this sample on the YSR and 
PSWQ-C was indicative of over reporting of worry and suggested that lower than expected 
internal consistencies, particularly for the Worry and Punishment subscales of the TCQ-A may 
have been affected by sample characteristics.  The TCQ-A reliability properties should therefore 
be considered preliminary until replication in other clinical and non-clinical samples can 
demonstrate more conclusive reasons for low internal consistency.  
Beyond incomplete evidence of reliability, the conclusions from the current study are 
further limited by the uneven subscale composition created when editing the TCQ-A to improve 
its factor structure.  The five-factor solution achieved with the 14-item version yielded 
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encouraging results that were equivalent to, if not, an improvement upon the adult TCQ; 
however, in its current form, the punishment subscale contains fewer items than the other TCQ-
A subscales due to item 10’s poor factor loading and subsequent removal.  While unequal 
subscale composition is not a serious threat to the overall psychometric soundness of the 
measure, content validity for the punishment subscale may be lacking due to limited 
measurement.   The punishment subscale also had the lowest correlation with the total score, 
further indicating a lack of adequate measurement and limited convergence with the broader 
construct of thought suppression.  Future investigations should aim to revise the problem of 
asymmetrical subscale composition and the limited reliability and validity of the Punishment 
subscale by creating and testing replacement items. 
Beyond problems of interpretability due to inadequate reliability and validity evidence 
for the Punishment subscale, the present examination is limited by the lack of comparison to a 
clinical sample of adolescents with internalizing disorders.  The initial psychometric properties 
obtained herein are promising; however, being that a large proportion of research using the adult 
version of the TCQ has been performed using clinical samples, the lack of clinical psychometrics 
for the TCQ-A limits the utility and generalizability of the measure.  Therefore, an important line 
of future research would be to confirm the reliability, validity, and factor structure of the TCQ-A 
within those adolescent clinical samples that are most likely to be the target of research utilizing 
the measure – namely specific phobias, OCD, GAD, PTSD, and depressive disorders.  Likewise, 
the lack of concurrent validity evidence for the Distraction, Social, and Reappraisal subscales 
demands further investigation within clinical samples.  Lastly, criterion validity, when predicting 
clinical status, should be examined as further evidence of validity properties.  
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Other sample characteristics, beyond clinical status, are problematic in generalizing 
findings from the current study, namely the gender distribution, the relative socioeconomic 
status, and the regional specificity of the sample.  First, participants were obtained from 
educational institutions in which the socioeconomic demographics trend toward middle-to-high 
income households, limiting generalizability to adolescents from lower income backgrounds.  
Second, nearly a third of the sample was obtained from an undergraduate population, which 
limits the generalizability of the current findings.  Including a convenience sample of adolescents 
from the undergraduate population ensured the current study was able to obtain the full age range 
of adolescents (i.e. 12yrs.-18yrs.).  However, the disproportionately large undergraduate sample 
introduces confounds to the construct of “adolescence,” for which the TCQ-A is designed.  
Third, the obtained sample, was skewed toward females (approximately 68% female).  There 
was no main effect of gender on TCQ-A total or individual subscale scores in the current sample 
despite the disproportionate sample composition.  Similarly, the psychometric properties of the 
adult TCQ were stable when split by gender (Wells & Davies, 1994), and therefore it can be 
reasonable assumed that the gender distribution in the current sample would not meaningfully 
change the psychometric performance of the TCQ-A when extrapolating to other samples.  
Nevertheless, adolescent females are known to endorse internalizing symptomatology at greater 
rates than males (see Hankin & Abramson, 2001; Lewinsohn, Gotlib, Lewinsohn, Seeley, & 
Allen, 1998), and for that reason, the psychometric results herein should be interpreted with care 
when considering generalizability to adolescent male populations.   
Once the psychometric properties of the TCQ-A can be replicated and extended to 
clinical samples, future research investigating the consequences and correlates of thought 
suppression engagement should be performed with the TCQ-A to mirror the adult literature.  Of 
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particular interest would be including the TCQ-A in empirical investigations of cognitive and 
cognitive-behavioral models of psychopathology in adolescents.  Most models of youth 
psychopathology, particularly internalizing disorders, have been developed using adult 
conceptualizations that have simply been assumed to downwardly extend to adolescents.  An 
important and missing line of clinical research is to validate those models.  In  many cases, 
testing models of psychopathology in adolescents would include the variable of thought 
suppression, which was not previously measurable in adolescents due to the absence of an 
empirically derived and tested instrument such as the TCQ-A.   
Lastly, the TCQ-A could have potential applications in clinical trials research for 
disorders like OCD, GAD, PTSD, and major depression.  While, strictly speaking, the TCQ-A 
and the adult TCQ are not intended as measures of diagnostic symptomatology, treatment 
outcome research could be enhanced by investigating the cognitive effects that psychotherapies 
produce.  The TCQ-A would be an interesting measure to include in youth outcome research, 
particularly considering the inclusion of a Reappraisal subscale, which outwardly appears to 
measure cognitive strategies seen in most cognitive and cognitive-behavioral therapies, such as 
thought challenging and probability estimation.  The TCQ-A would not provided diagnostic 
outcome, but it would be able to offer at least initial evidence of direct cognitive change in 
treatments for youth, an area of research that has as of yet been particularly ignored in child and 
adolescent clinical trials.  Thought suppression treatment effects (i.e. changes in strategy use 
from punishment at pre-treatment to distraction following treatment) in adult anxiety treatment 
has been demonstrated (Abramowitz et al., 2003; Reynolds & Wells, 1999).  Similar 
investigations of changes in thought suppression engagement among adolescents would 
significantly further our knowledge of cognitive effects of treatments, as currently very little is 
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known regarding CBT’s treatment efficacy for addressing the cognitive component of the 
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